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Abstract
This paper investigates the problem good-case latency of Byzantine agreement, broadcast and state
machine replication in the synchronous authenticated setting. The good-case latency measure
captures the time it takes to reach agreement when all non-faulty parties have the same input (or in
BB/SMR when the sender/leader is non-faulty) and all messages arrive instantaneously. Previous
result implies a lower bound showing that any Byzantine agreement or broadcast protocol tolerating
more than n/3 faults must have a good-case latency of at least ∆. Our first result is a matching
tight upper bound for a family of protocols we call 1∆. We propose a protocol 1∆-BA that solves
Byzantine agreement in the synchronous and authenticated setting with optimal good-case latency
of ∆ and optimal resilience f < n/2. We then extend our protocol and present 1∆-BB and 1∆-SMR
for Byzantine fault tolerant broadcast and state machine replication, respectively, in the same setting
and with the same optimal good-case latency of ∆ and f < n/2 fault tolerance.
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1 Introduction
Byzantine agreement (BA) and Byzantine broadcast (BB) are fundamental problems in
distributed computing, and one of the most important practical applications of BA and BB
is to implement Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) state machine replication (SMR).
In this paper, we argue that a new model for BA and BB is needed due to the following
practical considerations. First, lock-step execution where replicas start and end each round
at the same time, should not be assumed. Most theoretical works assume lock-step execution,
as a result, the latency of BA/BB protocols is typically measured by the round complexity.
Such a lock-step assumption simplifies the protocol design but it is considered impractical
because it not only is hard to enforce but also leads to poor performance. Secondly, BFT
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SMR protocols typically care about the good-case, in which a stable honest leader stays
in charge and drives consensus on many decisions. However, classical BA/BB protocols
tend to optimize their worst-case latency, which is f + 1 rounds for tolerating f faults [2].
Since f is typically assumed to be linear in n, any BA/BB protocol will inevitably have a
poor worst-case latency as n increases. Furthermore, for a more accurate characterization
of latency, we adopt the separation between the conservative bound ∆ and the actual
(unknown) bound δ [3]. Finally, instead of measuring only the traditional worst-case latency
to terminate, practical SMR protocols are intended to run forever; replicas commit or decide
on an ever-growing sequence of values. Motivated by the above considerations, we propose
the good-case latency to commit as the main metric, which is defined as follows.
I Definition 1 (good-case latency for Byzantine fault tolerant state machine replication). The
good-case latency is the maximal latency (over all adversarial strategies) until all honest
replicas commit given:
1. (good leader) An honest leader is in charge.
2. (good network) All messages arrive instantaneously, i.e., δ = 0.
3. (good compute) All local computation is instantaneous.
Of course, in practice, communication and computation are never instantaneous, but the
good case definition captures the intuition that they are much smaller than the pessimistic
upper bound ∆. From the good-case latency definition of BFT SMR above, it is natural
to define the good-case latency for BB by replacing the good leader property with good
sender : the designated sender is honest. Similarly, we define the good-case latency for BA by
replacing the good leader property with good input: all honest replicas have the same input.
The good input property also ties back to the good-case of BFT SMR because if the leader
is honest, then all honest replicas receive the same input from the leader.
The main goal of our paper is to develop BA and BB protocols with optimal good-case
latency and apply them to BFT SMR protocols under the synchronous and authenticated
setting. Due to space constraints, in this brief announcement we only present a synchronous
Byzantine agreement protocol 1∆-BA with optimal good-case latency of ∆ (Theorem 3
and 4) and optimal resilience of f < n/2.
2 Byzantine Agreement with Optimal Good-case Latency
We consider n replicas in a reliable, authenticated all-to-all network, where up to f replicas
can be malicious and behave in a Byzantine fashion, and rest of the replicas are honest.
Without loss of generality, we assume n = 2f + 1. We assume standard digital signatures
and public-key infrastructure (PKI). We use 〈x〉p to denote a signed message x by replica p.
I Definition 2 (Byzantine Agreement). A Byzantine agreement protocol provides the following
three guarantees.
Agreement. If two honest replicas commit value b and b′ respectively, then b = b′.
Termination. All honest replicas eventually commit and terminate.
Validity. If all honest replicas have the same input value, then all honest replicas commit
on the value.
We first show a lower bound of ∆ on the good-case latency, adapted from [1].
I Theorem 3. Any Byzantine agreement or broadcast protocol that is resilient to f ≥ n/3
faults must have a good-case latency at least ∆.
I. Abraham, K. Nayak, L. Ren, and Z. Xiang 47:3
Initially, every replica i has an input bi, starts Step 1 at the same time t = 0, and sets blck = ⊥.
1. Propose. Sign and send the input value bi to all others. Once receiving f + 1 distinct signed
messages of the same value b, form a proposal B with these messages as B = {〈b〉j}f+1.
2. Forward. Upon forming or receiving a valid new proposal B containing f + 1 distinct signed
messages of the same value b, forward B to all other replicas, set vote-timerB for proposal B
to ∆ and start counting down.
3. Vote. When vote-timerB for proposal B containing value b reaches 0, if the replica does not
receive another valid proposal B′ containing f + 1 distinct signed messages of a different value
b′ 6= b, it broadcasts a vote in the form of 〈vote, B〉i.
4. Commit. Upon collecting f +1 distinct signed votes 〈vote, B〉 of a valid proposal B containing
value b at time t, (i) if t ≤ 3∆, it broadcasts these f + 1 votes, sets blck = b, and commits b, (ii)
if t > 3∆, it sets blck = b.
5. Byzantine agreement. At time 4∆, invoke an instance of Byzantine agreement with blck as
the input. If not committed, commit on the output of the Byzantine agreement. Terminate.
Figure 1 1∆-BA Protocol under the Synchronous Model.
We now briefly describe the 1∆-BA presented in Figure 1. Initially, all replicas have an
input, and set their locked value blck to be some default value ⊥. When protocol starts,
all replicas first sign and broadcast its input value, and try to form a proposal containing
f + 1 signed messages of an identical value (Step 1). When any replica i has a proposal of
value b, it forwards the proposal to detect conflict (Step 2). After the replica forwards the
proposal, it locally starts a timer called vote-timer to wait for ∆ time period. If the timer
expires and the replica does not receive any conflicting proposal containing a different value
b′ 6= b, it broadcasts a vote message for the proposal (Step 3). Once the replica gathers f + 1
distinct vote messages for the proposal containing value b within time 3∆, it broadcasts
these vote messages, sets locked value blck = b and commits the value b. If the f + 1 distinct
vote messages for value b are received later than 3∆, the replica only sets locked value
blck = b without committing the value (Step 4). At time 4∆, the replica initiates an instance
of Byzantine agreement with its locked value as the input, and any replica that has not
committed yet will commit on the output of the agreement (Step 5).
I Theorem 4. 1∆-BA protocol solves Byzantine agreement in the synchronous authenticated
setting with optimal good-case latency of ∆ and optimal resilience of f < n/2.
3 Conclusion
We propose using the non-lock-step models and the good-case latency metric for Byzantine
agreement and broadcast as they better capture what matters in practical BFT SMR. In the
full version of this paper, we propose the first Byzantine agreement, broadcast, and state
machine replication protocols with optimal good-case latency of ∆.
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